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Abstract 
The study examines the relationship between board structure and firm performance in the state owned enterprises 
in Kenya. Data was collected from 25 state owned enterprises in the commercial and manufacturing sector 
covering the period 2014 to 2016.  To establish the relationship between the variables the study employed panel 
data regression, with fixed and random effects. The study findings established that board size had a positive and 
significant effect on firm performance. In contrast board independence had negative and significant effect on 
firm performance. The study findings indicate that that large boards improved firm performance while board 
independence had a negative impact on firm performance. Results for control variables firm size and firm age 
were positive and statistically significant. The findings from this study contributes to literature in corporate 
governance in public sector where comparatively empirical evidence is limited. The findings will prove useful in 
guiding policy in corporate governance practices in the public sector in Kenya. 
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1.1Introduction 
Board of directors are at the epicenter of the debate on effectiveness of corporate governance practices both in 
the public and private sector. The Cadbury report (1992) defined corporate governance as a system through 
which organizations are directed and controlled. Board of directors are charged both with roles of directing and 
controlling these entities.  Tricker (1984) stated that boards of directors were responsible for developing strategic 
direction and monitoring performance. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997) it is through corporate 
governance mechanisms including board structure that investors are guaranteed returns for their investments. 
Love (2011) observed that corporate governance mechanisms enhanced oversight leading to improved operating 
performance. In addition, it helped reduce risks and maximize value of investments by ensuring entities invested 
in profitable assets. 
 State owned enterprises (SOEs) play critical roles in both developed and developing countries. They are 
involved in provision of critical services including; education, health, water, in addition to economic growth. 
According to a World Bank report (2014) globally SOEs accounted for 20 percent of investments and six percent 
of employment. In addition, OECD (2015) stipulated that in the Middle East countries, SOEs accounted for 20-
50 percent of all investments. Collapse or underperformance of these SOEs could negatively impact these 
economies, leading to disruption of critical services, and become a fiscal burden. Due to their importance, 
attempts have been made by governments and other stakeholders to reform these SOEs to ensure that they are 
performing efficiently and effectively. The major areas of concern in these SOEs are accountability, 
transparency and performance. To address this challenges a number of countries have made attempts to reform 
these entities. These reforms have largely focused in improvement of corporate governance practices. The World 
Bank and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have steered the development of 
sound corporate governance practices among the SOEs globally. The World Bank (2014) toolkit on corporate 
governance for state owned enterprises, reaffirms the importance of sound corporate governance principles to 
ensure efficiency and effectiveness in SOEs. Similarly, OECD (2015) on principles of corporate governance 
advocates for SOEs to operate in efficient and transparent manner. In Kenya the government developed 
Mwongozo (2015) code of corporate governance for state corporations. The code gives guidelines on how SOEs 
boards should be structured to ensure transparency, accountability and improved performance. This followed a 
presidential report (GoK, 2013) that highlighted challenges facing SOEs in Kenya including; poor performance, 
multiple competing objectives, budgetary constraints, political interference, and agency principal conflicts.  
 
1.2 Board Structure in State Owned Enterprises in Kenya 
In Kenya SOEs the board of directors are responsible and accountable for all corporate governance matters. 
Mwongozo (2015) code of governance for state corporations specifically guides how boards should be structured 
to achieve accountability and improved performance. On the subject of board size Mwongozo code recommends 
board membership of 7-9 members. Regarding board independence Mwongozo recommends that at least thirty 
percent of board members to be non-executive directors. The state corporation advisory committee (SCAC) is 
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the body corporate tasked with roles of ensuring implementation of Mwongozo code. The committee is involved 
in training and assessing performance of state corporations’ boards in Kenya based on Mwongozo guide. State 
corporation’s boards of directors are also accountable to other stakeholders including; investors, line ministries 
and parliament through parliamentary committees. Based on this background it is predicted that sound corporate 
governance mechanisms could lead to improved performance and accountability in state owned entities. It is on 
this background that this study aims to examine the contribution of board structure as corporate governance 
mechanism towards improvement of SOEs performance in the commercial and manufacturing sector in Kenya. 
This study aims to address the following questions. 
a. Does board size influence the performance SOEs in Kenya? 
b. Does board independence influence the performance SOEs in Kenya? 
c. Does firm size as control variable influence the relationship between board structure and 
performance SOEs in Kenya? 
d. Does age since incorporation as control variable influence the relationship between board structure 
and performance in SOEs in Kenya? 
 
2.0 Literature Review 
2.1Theoretical Foundation 
The Agency theory as advanced by Jensen and Meckling (1979) states that agency problems arises as result of 
separation of ownership from control. This results to information asymmetry between the agent and the principal. 
Consequently, agency conflicts arise as the self-seeking agent may not always act on the best interest of the 
principal. Proponents of the agency theory argue that the agency conflicts could be resolved through corporate 
governance mechanisms. Bathala and Rao (1995) observed that non-executive directors offered monitoring roles 
thus helping to solve or mitigate the agency conflicts between management and shareholders. Kahle, Wang and 
Wu (2014) in support of agency theory argues for control of the self-seeking agent through board dominated by 
non- executive directors. Large boards are more effective in monitoring and controlling CEO compared to 
smaller boards. Kiel and Nicholson (2003) agreeing that large boards were more effective in controlling the 
agent thus reducing the agency conflicts. 
 In contrast to the agency theory, the stewardship theory holds that managers are naturally trustworthy 
hence they aim to protect and not exploit the shareholders interest (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). The proponents 
of stewardship theory advise for more control for the steward to drive the organization to success. Proponents of 
stewardship theory advocates for governance structures that empower the steward as opposed to control. Smaller 
board as opposed to large board are preferred. Insider dominated boards as opposed to independent board 
preferred (Muth & Donaldson ,1998).  
The stakeholder’s theory (Freeman, 1984) offers another perspective on board structure. The theory holds 
that boards of directors are important in managing the interests of competing stakeholders. Based on this theory 
boards should have representation of diverse stakeholders. Boards of directors should also help identify the 
diverse objectives of stakeholders and help to manage them (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). This study aims to 
examine the effect of board structure on firm performance in state owned enterprises in Kenya. Based on the 
theoretical review this study was premised in the agency perspective on corporate governance. 
 
2.2Empirical Review 
2.2.1 Board Size and Firm Performance 
Empirical literature reviewed indicates a number studies examined the effect of board size on firm performance. 
The findings from both developed and developing economies were mixed and inconclusive. Based on previous 
studies board Size was operationalized as the total numbers of board membership (Saha & Kabra, 2019; Oba, 
Tigrel, & Sener, 2014).   
 Saha and Kabra (2019)  studied the impact of corporate governance on firm performance in India. The 
study  sampled 100  firms listed in Bombay Securties Exchange covering the period 2014-2018. Data was 
analyzed using regression analysis. The study established positive and  significant relatiosnhip between board 
size and firm performance in India. The results suggesting large boards were more effective in monitoring 
management leading to improved performance. 
 Balagobei (2018) in  a study in Sri Lanka  examined the relationship between corporate governance and 
firm performance. The study obtained and tested  data from listed firms from Sri Lanka covering the period 
2010-2015. The study established that board size had a negative and significant effect on return on assets as a 
measure of performance. This suggested that smaller boards were more efficient in ensuring better performance 
in Sri lanka.  
Ghabayen, Jaradat, Hardan and Al-Shbail (2018) in a study in Jordanian banking sector examined the effect 
of board size on firm performance. Using panel data regression analysis, the study tested the relationships 
between the variables covering the period 2004 to 2013. The study established insignificant relationship between 
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board size and firm performance. Further, the study concluded that optimal board size was between 9 and 12 
members. The study concluded too large or too small boards were ineffective in improving firm performance. 
Kalsie  and Shrivastav (2016) examined the effect of board size on firm performance of firms listed at NSE 
India covering the period 2008 to 2012. To investigate the relationship between the variables  the study 
employed  panel generalised least square, fixed and random models.The study conluded that board size was 
positively and signifcantly related to firm perfromance in India. 
Fauzi and  Locke (2012) examined the effect  of board size on firms performance using data from listed 
companies in  New zealand covering the period 2009 to 2012. Data was analyzed using the generalized equation 
model.The study concluded that large board were more effective in monitoring roles and improved firm 
performance significantly in New Zealand  listed firms. 
Topak (2011) examined the effect of board size on firm performance in Turkey. The study sampled data 
from 122 listed companies covering period of 2004 to 2009. To draw conlusion the study employed panel data 
regression.  The study established insignificant effect of board size on firm performance in Turkey. 
Emeka-Nwokeji and Agubata (2019) in a study in Nigeria tested the effect of board size on performance 
using data from non-financial firms listed in Nigeria securities exchange. The study established positive and 
significant effect of board size on firms’ performance in Nigeria. This means that large boards significantly 
improved firm performance. 
Heo (2018) in a study in Korea examined the effect of corporate governance on firm performance of state 
ownned enterprises. The study established positive and signficant effect of board size on performance in SOEs. 
The results suggested that large boards were more effective and transparent resulting to impoved  performance of 
SOEs in Korea. 
2.2.2 Board Independence and Firm performance 
Agency theory predicts that independent boards will help monitor management leading to confidence among 
investors leading to improved performance. However empirical evidence on the relationship is inconclusive. 
Based on previous studies board independence was measured as percentage of non-executive directors in the 
board (Saha & Kabra ,2019; Nath, Islam & Saha, 2015). 
Khan, Al-Jabri and Saif (2019) examined the association between board structure and corporate financial 
performance in Malaysia. To establish the nature of relationship the study adopted a dynamic panel model. The 
study established positive and significant relationship between board independence and firm performance in 
Malaysia. 
Rashid (2018) examined the influence of board independence on firm economic performance of listed firms 
in Bangladesh. The study established the effect of board independence on economic performance was 
insignificant. However, the study established association between board size and economic performance was 
positive and significant. 
Liu, Miletkov, Wei and Yang (2015) examined the effect of board independence on firm performance in 
China. Data was analyzed using generalized regression technique. The study established positive and significant 
effect of board independence on firm performance. The study further established that board independence was 
stronger in government controlled enterprises. This study confirmed that independent directors constrained 
insider dealing which boosted investor confidence resulting to improved performance.  
Nath, Islam and  Saha (2015)  examined the relationship between board structure and firm performance in 
pharmaceutical companies in Bangladesh. The study  established that the relatioship between  board 
independence and firm performance  was insignificant Dhaka securities exchange.  
Niki, Setiany, Haryono, Suhardjanto and Nurharjanto (2018) investigated the effect of corporate governance 
mechanisms on  firm performance before and after privatisation using SOEs in Indonesia. The study used mixed 
methods combining both primary and secondary data. The results revealed that corporate governance index was 
positively related to firm performannce.  
Malik ( 2012) examined the effect of board independence on share prices using data from Karachi securities 
exchange 30 share index. The study  covered a period  of two years between 2009  and 2010. The study 
established the relationship between board independence and share prices was insignificant in Karachi securities 
exchange. 
 
2.3 Conceptual Framework 
Based on that based on agency theoretical framework and empirical evidence this study conceptualized a 
relationship between corporate governance variables including; board size, board independence and firm 
performance as presented in figure below. 
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3.1 Research Design. 
This study takes a correlational study approach by examining the relationship among the research variables. 
Correlational study aims to test the significance and direction of relationship between variables. This information 
provides insights and is useful in making future predictions about phenomenon (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010). 
 
3.2 Data collection 
The study collected data from secondary sources; derived from annual reports. The annual reports were obtained 
from Twenty-five (25) of the thirty-three (33) SOEs in commercial and manufacturing sector as categorized by 
state advisory committee (SCAC, 2020). The study covered a period of three years 2014 to 2016. Return on 
assets (ROA) was used as proxy of firm performance; the measure was computed using financial data obtained 
from financial statements in the annual reports. Data on board size and board independence was obtained from 
governance reports in the annual reports. Data on Firm age and form size as control variables was computed 
using information from annual reports. 
 
3.3 Study Hypothesis 
H1: Board size positively and significantly influenced firm performance SOEs in Kenya.  
H2:  Board independence positively and significantly influenced firm performance in SOEs in Kenya. 
H3: Firm size as control variable significantly influenced the relationship between board structures and firm 
performance in SOEs in Kenya. 
 H4: Firm age as control variable significantly influenced the relationship between board structure and firm 
performance in SOEs in Kenya. 
 
3.4 Model Specification 
To examine the relationship between the variables the study employed panel data regression model with random 
and fixed effects. 
Firm Performance (ROA) =β0 +β1 BdSize +β2 PerIND +β3Firm Size +β4 Age +ε 
Where: 
ROA = Return on assets as measure of firm performance. 
BDsize = Board Size   a measure of corporate governance. 
PerIND = The percentage of independent directors. 
β0 the intercept 
ε the error term 
Dependent Variable 
The return on assets (ROA) as a measure of performance was used as the dependent variable. The value was 
operationalized as ratio of net income to total assets. Return on assets (ROA) ratio examined how well the 
entities utilizes assets to generate revenues and profits. This makes the ratio to be useful to investors and 
management in decision making (Warrad, 2015). 
Independent Variables 
Board size and Board independence were conceptualized to have effect on firm performance. This was based on 
theoretical framework and empirical studies evidence that suggested that large boards, and independent boards 
were effective in monitoring management leading to improved performance (Malik,2012; Liu, Miletkov, Wei & 
Yang ,2015; Rashid, 2018). 
Control Variables 
The age since incorporation and firm size acted as control variables. This was based on evidence from previous 
studies that suggested that the size of the firm and age influenced the level of development in corporate 
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governance. Large firms were predicted to have functional governance systems when compared to smaller firms. 
Table 1: Operationalization of Study Variables. 
Variable Measure 
 Independent Variables 
Board size 
  
Measured as  a number of board members 
Board independence 
 Dependent Variable 
Firm performance 
Control Variables                                                
Measured as percentage of non-executive directors  
Return of assets ratio as proxy for firm performance. 
 
Firm size Measured  as logarithm of total assets 
Age  Measured as age of firm since incorporation 
  
 
4.0 Results and Discussion 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Std .Dev Min Max 
Bsize 75 10.08 10.08 4 16 
PerIND 75 .418 .193 0 .818 
AGE Firm 75 37.08 20.704 6 94 
ROA 75 -.0150 .1600 -.7624 .378 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics results for the study variables. The results show board size for 
SOEs had a mean size of 10.08 members with minimum of 4 members and a maximum of 16 members. This 
mean board size is above the recommended board size by the Mwongozo code of corporate governance size of 7 
to 9 members. In addition, the results indicate the percentage of independent directors had a mean of 41.8% 
percentage and a maximum of 81.8% percentage. The mean of 41.8% is above the minimum percentage 
recommended by Mwongozo code of corporate governance recommends of at least thirty percent of board 
membership to be independent directors.  The results indicate age since incorporation had mean of 37 years with 
a minimum age of six years. The results on ROA as measure of performance indicates mean -1.5 % with a 
maximum ROA of 37.84% but with a minimum of -76.25%. A negative mean ROA means that majority of 
SOEs were loss making. 
 
4.2 Pearson Correlation 
Table 3:  Pearson Correlation. 
 ROA Bsize PerIND LOGTA LOGAGE 
ROA 1     
Bsize 0.2798*   1    
PerIND -0.1643   -0.2561*   1   
LOGTA 0.2139    0.1079    0.4994* 1  
LOGAGE 0.1469   -0.3505*   0.3002*   0.1888    1 
Note: Notes: Bsize =board size, PerIND =percentage of independent directors, Log TA =firm size,
LogAGE =age since incorporation 
The Pearson correlation measures the relationship between the variables and the strength of the association. 
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation results between the study variables. The results show positive 
correlation (r = 0.279) between board size and ROA statistically significant. Further, the results show board 
independence had a negative correlation with ROA (r= -0.1643). In addition, the results indicate ROA had a 
positive correlation (r= 0.2139) with firm size. Board Size had a negative correlation with age since 
incorporation that was statistically significant (r=-0.3505). Board independence had a positive correlation 
(r=0.3002) with age of firm since incorporation. 
 
4.3 Diagnostics Tests 
4.3.1Multi- Collinearity Test 
Multi-Collinearity problems occurs when there exists high correlation among the explanatory variables. This will 
interfere with the interpretation of regression outputs.  As result, absence of multicollinearity is a key assumption 
for regression results to be dependable. Table 6 presents the multicollinearity statistics. The results reveal VIF 
values of below < 10. This means multicollinearity problem was not significant. This means the regression 
results obtained are dependable. 
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Table 4: Collinearity statistics 
 Tolerance VIF 
 Bsize .221 4.521 
PerIND .230 4.343 
LogTA .894 1.119 
LogAge .817 1.224 
a Dependent Variable: ROA 
4.3.2 Heteroscedasticity test 
The Breusch –pagan test was used to test for heteroscedacity problem. This problem occurs when there exists 
variance in the error term. Heteroscedacity is a key assumption for the results of regression to be consistent. The 
Breusch pagan test results show Chi- square value of 20.26 with p = value of 0.0004 < 0.05 statistically 
significant to reject the null hypothesis, that variances for explanatory variables were constant. This means 
heteroscedasticity problem was not significant as the variances among the explanatory variables were not 
constant.  
Table 5: Breusch–Pagan test Results 
chi2(4)       =    20.26 
  Prob > chi2   =   0.0004 
Ho: Constant variance  
4.3.3 Hausman Test 
Table 6: Hausman Test Results 
                                    
fixed    (b)                  
                                   
fixed      (B)                
Difference (b – B) SE 
Bsize .0014847      .0110162        -.0095316         .0136229 
PerIND -.1070371     -.1448559         .0378188         .1869311 
LOGTA .1081519      .0269776         .0811743         .0538084 
LOGAGE -.5003987      .0411667        -.5415654         .279784 
Ho: Random effect 
H1: Fixed effect 
  b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained 
from xtreg Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic.  
  chi2(4) = 9.34       Prob>chi2 =      0.0532 
Table 6 presents Hausman tests results. The Hausman test was used to differentiate random and fixed 
effects in regression analysis. The results show p value of 0.0532 > 0.05 that is statistically insignificant. The 
null hypothesis H0 is that the random effect model was appropriate. This means the null hypothesis was not 
rejected. The random model was therefore preferred to the fixed effect model. 
 
4.4 Regression Results. 
4.4.1 Regression Results Summary 
Table 7: Regression Results Summary 
Prob > F 0.0009 
R-squared 0.2326 
Adj R-squared 0.1887 
Root MSE 0.1441 
Table 7 presents summary output of regression results of board structure on firm performance. The results 
reveal R squared value of 0.1886 statistically significant with p value < 0.05. This means that 18.8% changes in 
the response variable could be explained by the explanatory variable. This finding reveals that corporate 
governance variables including the board size and board independence significantly contributed to firm 
performance of SOEs in Kenya as measured by return on assets. 
4.4.2 Effect of Board Structure on Firm Performance. 
Table 8: Regression Results  
ROA     Coef.        Std. Err t     P>|t|      [95% Conf. Interval] 
Bsize  .020825    .0094887      2.19    0.032      .0019004     .039749 
PerIND  -.2730657     .107876     -2.53    0.014     -.4882175    -.057913 
LOGTA  .0271655    .0116209      2.34    0.022      .0039884     .050342 
LOGAGE  .0744558    .0306973      2.43    0.018      .0132319     .135679 
Cons  -1.000274    .2587453     -3.87    0.018      -1.516325    -.484222 
a. Dependent Variable: ROA 
Table 8 presents regression results of board structure on firm performance. The results indicate that board 
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size had a positive relationship with firm performance with positive coefficient β 0.0208 which was statistically 
significant with p value < 0.05. This suggest that unit increase in board size increased firm performance. This 
means that large boards increased board monitoring resulting to improved performance. 
The results on board independence show a negative relationship with firm performance with negative 
coefficient value β- 0.2730 statistically significant with p value < 0.05. The results suggest that increase in the 
percentage of independent directors had a negative effect on firm performance in SOEs in Kenya. This means 
board independence did not lead to improved performance.  
The results on the effect of firm size on firm performance measured by logarithm of total assets had positive 
and significant effect on firm performance, with positive coefficient value β 0.0271655. Age since incorporation 
as control variable also had positive effect on the relationship with firm performance with positive coefficient 
value β 0.0744 also statistically significant p value < 0.05. This means both firm size and age of firm as control 
variables contributed significantly to the relationship between board structure and firm performance. 
 
5.1 Conclusion and Recommendations 
The study examined the effect of board structure on firm performance in the state owned entities in commercial 
and manufacturing sector in Kenya. The results revealed significant positive effect of board size on firm 
performance in commercial and manufacturing SOEs in Kenya. This suggests that large boards contributed 
significantly to improved performance in SOEs in Kenya. This results are justified in the Agency theoretical 
framework that predicts that larger board are effective in monitoring management resulting to improved 
performance. This finding also in agreement with other previous studies (Saha & Kabra, 2019; Kalsie & 
Shrivastav, 2016; Fauzi & Locke, 2012. 
The results on the effect of board independence on firm performance established negative and significant 
effect on firm performance. This finding is not in consistent with agency theory perspective that predicts that 
independent boards will lead to improved monitoring function resulting to improved performance (Khan, Al-
Jabri & Saif, 2019; Rashid, 2018). This mean that independent directors negatively influenced the performance 
of commercial and manufacturing SOEs in Kenya. This suggest that higher percentage of independent directors 
had a negative effect on firm performance. This also suggest that the inclusion of independent SOEs board was 
not necessary to improve performance. Independent directors maybe lacking information about the entity 
operations hence thus making minimal contribution towards performance improvement. The findings are in 
agreement with other previous studies that established that the higher proportion of independent directors 
negatively related to firm performance (Saha & Kabra, 2019; Nath, Islam & Saha ,2015; Malik &2012).  
Finally, the study established positive and significant effect of control variables of firm size and age of firm 
since incorporation on firm performance. The findings on the effect of control variables suggest that large firms 
and those that had been existent for long periods had established strong governance structures resulting to 
improved performance. This study finding contributes to corporate governance literature in the public where 
comparatively it is limited due to minimal studies in the public sector context. The study findings will be useful 
in guiding decision and policy on how to improve corporate governance practices and performance in state 
owned enterprises in Kenya. Future studies should consider  addressing other aspects of corporate governance 
not addressed in this study including gender and board expertise. 
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